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ABSTRACT
The Lightning Network promises to alleviate Bitcoin’s known scal-
ability problems. The operation of such second layer approaches
relies on the ability of participants to turn to the blockchain to
claim funds at any time, which is assumed to happen rarely.
One of the risks that was identified early on is that of a wide
systemic attack on the protocol, in which an attacker triggers the
closure of many Lightning channels at once. The resulting high
volume of transactions in the blockchain will not allow for the
proper settlement of all debts, and attackers may get away with
stealing some funds.
This paper explores the details of such an attack and evaluates
its cost and overall impact on Bitcoin and the Lightning Network.
Specifically, we show that an attacker is able to simultaneously
cause victim nodes to overload the Bitcoin blockchain with requests
and to steal funds that were locked in channels.
We go on to examine the interaction of Lightning nodes with
the fee estimation mechanism and show that the attacker can con-
tinuously lower the fee of transactions that will later be used by
the victim in its attempts to recover funds - eventually reaching
a state in which only low fractions of the block are available for
lightning transactions. Our attack is made easier even further as the
Lightning protocol allows the attacker to increase the fee offered
by his own transactions.
We continue to empirically show that the vast majority of nodes
agree to channel opening requests from unknown sources and are
therefore susceptible to this attack.
We highlight differences between various implementations of
the Lightning Network protocol and review the susceptibility of
each one to the attack. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to
lower the systemic attack risk of the network.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Lightning Network [22] and other second layer solutions [7, 9,
12, 16] have been suggested as a solution to Bitcoin’s long-known
scalability issues [1, 5, 6, 27, 34]. The Lightning Network promises
to increase both the number of transactions that can be processed,
and the latency per transaction. In contrast, Bitcoin’s transaction
processing is bounded by its block creation rate, and its block size
limit, which is currently 1MB (although a slightly more nuanced
and widely adopted consensus rule has been introduced in Seg-
Wit [17]).1
The Lightning Network, along with other payment channel net-
works, aims to move the majority of transactions off-chain, with
the guarantee that the state of channels can be committed back to
the blockchain at any time, in a trustless fashion. It thus solves the
problem of a limited transaction rate by limiting the communica-
tion on payments to a much smaller set of participants, and lowers
the number of interactions with the blockchain.
A major assumption that underlies the trustless operation of
the Lightning Network is that participants will be able to post
transactions to the blockchain if they are faced with malicious or
non-responding peers. A concern that was raised long-ago is that
under conditions of blockchain congestion, this may not be the case:
many transactions that are meant to secure the funds of participants
will not be admitted promptly to the blockchain, which will allow
attackers to steal money.
In this paper we explore and analyze this attack scenario. We
lay concrete steps for executing a successful large-scale attack that
both creates the congestion effect and exploits it to steal funds from
victims. The reason that the attacker is guaranteed to steal funds
with a large-scale attack is that victims have a limited amount of
time (measured in blocks) to execute channel closures successfully
before the attacker succeeds in claiming their money for himself.
We show that the attack does not need to be as widespread
as it may initially appear. It can be executed on relatively few
channels, without any significant costs to the attacker. Specifically,
we show that even if the maximal number of victims’ transactions
get into blocks (up to the block’s limit), attacking only 85 channels
simultaneously guarantees the attacker will be able to steal some
funds, and that each additional attacked channel will have its funds
stolen as well.
In fact, it is rarely the case that Lightning participants pay suf-
ficiently high fees to fill up entire blocks. We explore the fee de-
termination mechanism and show that effectively a much smaller
number of simultaneously attacked channels is required for the
attacker to succeed.
Our attack technique leverages the way multi-hop payments are
executed in the network to trigger several conditions that combine
to assist the attacker:
• We manage to greatly inflate the number of transactions
needed to successfully close a channel by utilizing many
multi-hop payments through the channel.
• Honest nodes need to claim funds within a limited number of
blocks, otherwise they become available to an attacker. The
parameter ruling this is not set too high, otherwise funds are
locked for long periods of time in other cases. The various
1SegWit defines a new concept of block weight and redefines the network rule to a
maximum block weight of 4M units
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
08
51
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
5 J
un
 20
20
Jona Harris and Aviv Zohar
implementations use different parameters for this timeout.
For example, LND uses a value of 40 blocks.
• All implementations do not make use of the full amount of
time available to them to deploy closure transactions, making
the attack substantially easier. For example, LND initiates
the closure of channels only 10 blocks before the expiration
time.
• The timeout for retrieving funds is known in advance and
thus attacks can be timed so all victims attempt to send
transactions to the blockchain at the same time.
• Fees offered by these transactions are pre-set and the timing
for the attack can be chosen by the attacker (who will choose
to attack at times when the blockchain is congested and high
fees are required for acceptance).
• Unlike the victims, the attacker can increase the fee on his
transactions, and replace any remaining transactions made
by the victims to claim their funds (after the timeout).
We now provide a brief description of the attack that we evalu-
ated. A more detailed description appears in Section 3.
Outline of the attack:
I. Setup and Wait The attacker creates channels from a node
we designate as his “source node” to many victim nodes, and
locks funds into these channels. This step is preferably done when
blockchain fees are low, both to save costs and to set the channel’s
feerate to a low value. The attacker then prepares a node on the
Lightning Network that is able to receive funds (i.e., making sure
the other side of its channels has sufficient liquidity). We designate
this node as the “target node”. This can be achieved by opening
channels with other nodes (not necessarily victims) and sending
money out to purchase goods or to deposit at exchanges. The at-
tacker waits for an opportune moment to attack, predicting that
blockchain congestion conditions will last for several dozens of
blocks.
II. Initiating Payments The attack is then launched by sending
multiple lightning HTLC payments from the source node to the
target node using as much liquidity as possible and spreading it out
over as many HTLC payments as it is allowed to use.
III. Accepting Payments Once all HTLCs have reached the target
node, it accepts the payments and responds by sending back the
secrets required to guarantee receipt of the funds. As a result, the
target node’s channel is left without open HTLCs. HTLC secrets
make their way back to the victims that attempt to send them back
to the source node. The source node does not respond, leaving the
channels with open HTLCs that the victims can only claim on the
blockchain.
IV. Collect Expired HTLCs As the HTLCs’ timeout approaches,
the victims attempt to close the channels with the source node
and claim all HTLCs on the blockchain. This means they publish
many blockchain transactions all at once. Some of these will fail
to enter into blocks by the timeout due to congestion and high
blockchain fees. The attacker claims any HTLCs that remain past
expiration, using the replace-by-fee policy, and raises the fee of his
own transactions to be higher than that of the victims’ transactions.
Victim
Victim
Attacker’s 
source node
Attacker’s 
target node
Victim HTLC payment path
Figure 1: Attacker’s and victims’ nodes with payment routes
from the source node to the target
Figure 1 shows an example topology of Lightning channels. It
emphasizes the paths of the HTLC payments and how victims are
connected with the attacker. We note that whenever the attacker
has failed, the only cost that he suffers is that of the blockchain fees
involved with opening and closing channels with his victims. The
funds locked in the channels are retained and can be reused.
Usually, attackers can reduce the minimal number of victims
required for executing a successful attack, by exploiting fluctuations
in blockchain fees. We thus go on to explore the feerate estimation
mechanism used by the different lightning implementations. Using
real estimation results collected over a period of over two months,
we show that the fee used for the commitment and HTLC-claiming
transactions fluctuates greatly and has significant influence on the
success of the attack.
To demonstrate the steps of the attack outlined above, we re-
port on our prototype implementation of an attacker node. Our
prototype was evaluated on a locally established lightning network,
running over a Bitcoin regnet, and demonstrates that we can exploit
the actual clients running today’s Lightning Network.
A Lightning node can become a victim in the attack if it agrees to
open a channel jointly with the attacker. We go on to check which
nodes in the Lightning Network are susceptible to be attacked by
agreeing to open channels with us. We report on an experiment
that attempted to connect to nodes on the network and show that
a large majority (95%) of responding nodes agree to form such
connections (other nodes refuse for often benign reasons, such as
in-progress synching with the blockchain). We conclude that it is
therefore easy for the attacker to find enough victims to perform
a wide-scale attack. Since Nodes are able to open more than one
channel with each peer, attackers are able to steal more funds from
each such victim.
A side-effect of the attack is that the blockchain is flooded with
transactions made by lightning nodes, whose fees are not covered
by the attacker, but rather by his victims. This can be leveraged
as a tool in other attacks as well (e.g., preventing trade and other
on-chain activity).
Our final contribution in this paper is proposing several mitiga-
tion techniques that can greatly reduce the chance and scope of a
successful attack.
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Ethical Concerns. The attack that we discuss here can be used to
steal funds from users on the Lightning Network. While our specific
technique for attacking is detailed here, the general attack vector
was known ahead of time. We note that preprints of this paper
have been shared with the developers of the three main Lightning
implementations before submission.
The codewe used for simulating the attack is available onGitHub2,
without the full prototype implementation of the attacker, so as not
to provide attacking tools.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
gives some background on the Lightning Network and the different
transactions that are created as part of operating a payment channel.
Section 3 describes in detail the execution of the attack. In Section 4
we analyze the attack, explore how effective it might be and show
the minimal effort required to find potential victims. In Section 5
we study the fees used by nodes on the Lightning Network (for
blockchain transactions) to learn how they affect the success of an
attack. Section 6 discusses several potential ways to mitigate the
attack. Section 7 discusses related work, and finally we conclude
this work in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND ON LIGHTNING CHANNEL
TRANSACTIONS
Each channel on the Lightning Network can be used for multiple
transfers. Each transfer over the channel is executed by exchanging
Bitcoin transactions between the two parties. These transactions,
which are generally not sent to the blockchain are used as a fail-safe,
allowing the two participants in the channel to claim their funds in
case their peer misbehaves.
Under normal operating conditions, i.e, when both parties are
honest, nomore than 2 transactions should be published throughout
a channel’s entire lifetime. Our attack however, takes the victim’s
channel off of this “good path” and triggers the publication of
possibly hundreds of Bitcoin transactions. In this section we provide
background explaining which transactions are created and used to
support a channel’s operation and outlining the conditions under
which they are transmitted to the blockchain.
2.1 Channel Establishment
When two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to open a new lightning
channel, they first need to lock some coins to fund it. This is done
by creating and publishing a funding transaction. A funding trans-
action has one special output (possibly among other outputs) called
the funding output, which sends funds to a 2-of-2 multisig script,
corresponding to the private keys of the two parties. This means
the funding output can only be spent by a transaction signed by
both Alice and Bob. The value of the funding output determines the
total liquidity in the channel. To guarantee funds can be extracted
from the channel in case one side becomes uncooperative, another
transaction called commitment is created and signed by both par-
ties. A commitment spends the funding output and splits its value
between Alice and Bob, according to the most recent allocation they
agreed on (the commitment will have two outputs - one for Alice
and another for Bob). Each of them can publish the commitment at
any time to close the channel and claim their funds, without any
2https://github.com/jonahar/lightning-systemic-attack
action taken by the other party. For reasons we explain later, each
side holds a slightly different version of a commitment transaction.
2.2 Balance Redistribution and Commitment
Updates
Alice and Bob can agree on a new way to split the channel’s funds
between them (e.g. if Alice purchases some goods from Bob). To
do so, Alice and Bob create a new commitment that reflects the
changes – the values of the outputs in the new commitment will
match the new allocation between them.
Both sides must have an assurance that the other side will not
publish older commitments, especially if the allocation they repre-
sents awards that party more money than the last created commit-
ment. This is achieved by the revocation mechanism, that penalizes
participants who publish old commitments. In Alice’s commitment,
the output that is destined for her can in fact be spent not only by
Alice, but also by anyone else who knows a special revocation key.
The revocation key can be constructed from two secrets, held by
Alice and Bob (the secrets are commitment-specific). When Alice
and Bob agree on a new commitment, Alice will provide Bob with
her secret, allowing him to spend her output in the old commit-
ment. This removes any incentive Alice might have to publish the
old commitment. To prevent a race, and give Bob a fair chance of
spending Alice’s output from an older commitment, the output is
time-locked for spend by Alice. Alice can only spend her output af-
ter the commitment achieves a minimum number of confirmations
(determined by the channel-specific parameter to_self_delay),
while Bob can spend it immediately. In a similar way, Bob will
provide Alice with a secret, that would let her spend Bob’s output
in his old commitment transaction.
2.3 Multi-Hop Payments With HTLCs
An additional important property of the Lightning Network is its
ability to route payments between participants that do not share
a channel. This is achieved using Hash Time Locked Contracts
(HTLC). HTLCs are conditional expiring payments, that can be
routed through an untrusted intermediate node. HTLCs guarantee
that no party is able to leave at any moment and stealing other
node’s funds.
Suppose Alice wish to send funds to Carol via an intermediate
node Bob, with whom they both share a channel. Alice will offer
Bob the amount of payment (in addition to a small fee) if he would
send that amount to Carol. The payment starts by Carol generating
a secret s (the preimage), computing its hash value r = h(s) and
sending r to Alice. Alice will then make a payment to Bob, of the
amount she would like to send Carol plus an extra fee for Bob,
subject to Bob revealing some secret s ′ that hashes to r . The only
(feasible) way for Bob to claim these funds, is to make a similar
conditional payment to Carol - requesting her to reveal such s ′ in
order to receive the payment. Since Carol holds s , she will reveal
it to Bob and claim the payment from him. Bob will then reveal s
to Alice, to claim the payment from her. Each conditional payment
(by Alice to Bob and by Bob to Carol) has an expiration, after which
the payment initiator can claim the offered funds back to himself.
How HTLCs affect the commitment. When a new HTLC payment
is offered, the commitment must be updated to reflect the new state,
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commitment as expiration height 
approaches, and tries to claim outputs 
with his pre-signed HTLC-success
Figure 2: The transactions held by the channel’s parties with transactions published in the attack marked
and to enforce the details of the nodes’ agreement. This is done
by creating a special output, corresponding to that HTLC, in the
commitment transaction. The HTLC output is removed from the
transaction only once it is resolved, either by the receiver returning
the preimage or stating that he failed to obtain the secret. Since
multiple HTLCs may be pending resolution at a given point in time,
a commitment transaction may contain many HTLC outputs (in
addition to its two primary outputs for the two sides), resulting in
a very large commitment transaction.
It is important to note that an HTLC output is mirrored in the
commitment transactions of both sides of the channel (See the
HTLC-out and HTLC-in outputs in the commitments in Figure 2).
To facilitate revocation, these outputs, that correspond to the same
HTLC, are slightly different.
In the context of a specific commitment transaction, we refer to
the party holding this transaction as the local node, and the other
party as the remote node.
We now drill deeper into the structure of the HTLC-in and HTLC-
out outputs as these are relevant to our attack.
The HTLC-out output. HTLC-out is a commitment output corre-
sponding to an HTLC payment offered by the local node (the one
holding this commitment) to the remote node. This output enforces
all the rules regarding the HTLC payment agreement. As such, it
can be spent in one of the following ways:
• By the remote node using the HTLC preimage3
• By the local node, once the HTLC expired
The remote node can spend this output by a transaction referred to
as HTLC success (remote). This transaction should be signed only
by the remote node, and can be published at any point in time.
3this output can also be claimed by the remote node using a revocation key, but we
ignore this for brevity
The local node can spend this output by a transaction referred
to as HTLC timeout (local). This transaction can be published only
after the HTLC expired, and must be signed by both parties. Since
the local node should not depend on the remote node, the HTLC-
timeout (local) is created and pre-signed by the remote node when
the HTLC is created.
The HTLC-in output. HTLC-in output is very similar to an HTLC-
out, only that it represents a payment offered by the remote node.
Conditions for spending this output are similar, and notably, here
as well in order to spend HTLC-in using the preimage, the local
node must use a transaction signed by both parties, denoted HTLC-
success (local). Figure 2 depicts the different transactions held by
each party when an HTLC payment is added to the channel.
We shall later see that the fact that HTLC-success (local) trans-
actions require the signature of both parties will prevent the victim
from raising the fees for its transactions. In contrast, HTLC-timeout
(remote) transactions require only a signature by one node, which
will allow the attacker to change its transactions’ fees at will.
2.4 Replace-By-Fee Policy
We now briefly explain the mechanism used in Bitcoin to replace un-
confirmed mempool transactions that we use in the attack. Replace-
By-Fee (RBF) is a policy that allows transactions to opt-in for re-
placement by other conflicting transactions if they offer higher fees.
Replacing transactions in this manner can be useful for dealing
with confirmation delays that were caused by setting fees too low.
As specified in the Replace-by-Fee improvement proposal (BIP-
125 [11]), a transaction is replaceable (opts-in) either if it directly
signals that it is replaceable, or if one of its unconfirmed ancestors
is replaceable.
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The Lightning Network specifications [28] define some trans-
actions used by the protocol as replaceable. Specifically, HTLC-
success (local) transactions are replaceable, a fact that we utilize in
the attack to replace unconfirmed victims’ transactions and steal
funds.
3 THE FLOOD & LOOT ATTACK
In this section we describe our attack in greater detail. During the
attack, the attacker is able to steal funds from victims that agree to
open channels with him. The attacker ensures that many channels,
loaded with multiple unresolved HTLC payments, will all be closed
at the same time, leading to a high volume of transactions simulta-
neously waiting to be confirmed on the blockchain. Inevitably, such
congestion will result in some of the HTLC-claiming transactions
published by the victims failing to confirm before they timeout.
The attacker can claim any funds associated with HTLC payments
that timed out in this manner.
We now detail the four concrete steps the attacker takes from
the setup of the attack until the HTLCs are stolen, as well as the
actions of the victims. The steps are also detailed in Figure 3 (with
1 victim for simplicity).
Step I: Setup - Establishing Channels The attacker controls two
lightning nodes, denoted the source node and the target node. The
target node should be able to receive a sufficient amount of funds.
That means it has open channels with enough liquidity on its peers’
side (this can be achieved e.g. by buying some goodswith a lightning
payment or depositing coins to an exchange that accepts lightning
payments). The source node opens many channels with different
victims, possibly even multiple channels with each victim. All these
channels are initiated and funded by the attacker.
Figure 3a shows a single victim and the channels involved in the
attack. Note, that the attacker’s target node does not have to be
directly connected to the victim (only the source node need such a
direct channel).
Step II: Loading Channels With HTLC Payments Once all
channels are set up, the source node starts sending the maximum
possible number4 of HTLC payments to the target node, through
the victims’ channels.
Every HTLC payment offered by the source node is given the
same expiration height. This would result in all attacked channels
closing at the same time.
The attacker chooses the amount for each HTLC payment in a
way that utilizes the maximum funds that can be stolen. This is done
by spreading the maximum transferable amount (excluding fees)
equally across all HTLCs routed through the channel. Formally, for
a channel with balance b, a max_htlc_value_in_flight value of
M and a max_accepted_htlcs value of a, each payment’s amount
is
htlc_value = min(M,b − f ee)
a
where f ee is the fee paid by the commitment transaction. The exact
fee is calculated from the channel’s feerate (we discuss the channel’s
feerate in more detail in Section 5).
4The number of unresolved HTLC payments at a single moment is limited by the
max_accepted_htlcs parameter of the channel
Attacker’s 
source node
Attacker’s 
target node
Victim
Balance: 1;0 Balance: 1;0
(a) Establishing channels
HTLC 1 HTLC 1
HTLC 2 HTLC 2
HTLC 3 HTLC 3
HTLC n HTLC n
⋮ ⋮
Victim
Balance: 0;0
Unresolved: 1
Balance: 0;0
Unresolved: 1Attacker’s 
source node
Attacker’s 
target node
(b) Making HTLC payments
preimages returned
Attacker ignores
   preimages return
HTLC 1
HTLC 2
HTLC 3
HTLC n
Victim
⋮
Balance: 0;0
Unresolved: 1
Balance: 0;1
Attacker’s 
source node
Attacker’s 
target node
(c) Target node returns the preimages and the source node ignores
requests to resolve HTLCs
Victim
HTLC 1
HTLC 2
HTLC 3
HTLC n
⋮
Balance: 1-𝛼;𝛼 Balance: 0;1
Attacker’s 
source node
Attacker’s 
target node
(d) Waiting for expiration to collect HTLCs
Figure 3: The main attack phases
At that point, the target node does not yet return the preimages
to resolve the HTLC payments, and keeps them all in pending state.
At the end of this stage, all the attacked channels are saturated with
pending HTLCs.
Step III: Returning Preimages on Last Hop After all possible
payments were made by the source node, the target node starts
resolving all HTLC payments it received by returning the preimages.
The target node now possesses the total amount of funds sent by
the source node and may close all his channels cooperatively at
any time, to use these funds anywhere else.
Once each victim receives the preimages, it asks the source node
to resolve the HTLCs and move their amount to the victim’s side of
the channel. The source node, however, stops any communication
with his victims and refuses to resolve the HTLCs. Any further
messages from the victims are ignored.
We note that if the target node does not have enough channels
to allow a large enough number of unresolved incoming HTLCs to
accommodate many victims at once, it could perform steps II and
III of the attack one channel at a time, i.e., saturate a single channel
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of the source node with HTLCs, then return all preimages for that
channel and proceed to the next victim channels. The key point is
that preimages of HTLCs that are routed through the same victim
channel must be delayed and then returned together in a single
batch.
Step IV: Collecting Expired HTLCs Each attacked channel is
now full with unresolved HTLC payments, and the victims have
all the preimages required to claim them. Since the attacker is un-
cooperative, they cannot claim these payments through Lightning
interactions, but will have to close their channels, publish their
commitments and claim the HTLCs on the blockchain.
The time at which a victim will publish his commitment to uni-
laterally close his channel, is determined by a safety parameter
we denote commitment_broadcast_delta.5 The Lightning speci-
fications suggest a value of 7 blocks before the HTLC expires, but
it is an implementation-dependent decision. Among the 3 major
implementations, LND uses the highest value of 10 blocks. Since
a significant majority of nodes on the network run LND, as sug-
gested in [20, 21], most victims will publish their commitments at
the same time (height). Along with the commitments, each victim
will also publish many HTLC-success (local) transactions to claim
the HTLC outputs from his commitment, leading to a high volume
of transactions trying to enter the blockchain all at once.
A sufficiently large number of attacked channels guarantees that
some of the victims’ transactions will not be confirmed before the
HTLCs expire, simply because of block space constraints. Once
the expiration height was reached, the attacker can also spend any
unspent HTLC output using HTLC-timeout (remote) transactions.
These transactions conflict with any HTLC-success published by
the victims, as they try to spend the same outputs. The attacker
is able to replace any victim’s transactions already in mempools,
since they are all replaceable using the Replace-By-Fee mechanism,
as we explain in Section 2.4.
Although HTLC outputs can be claimed by the victims even after
they expire, the attacker has a significant advantage at that point.
In order to replace victims’ transactions, the attacker must publish
his transactions with higher fees. The attacker knows exactly what
fee is used by his victims (this is derived from the channel’s feerate)
and can easily create transactions with the minimal fee required
to outcome those of the victims. The HTLC-timeout used by the
attacker should only be signed by him, and he can set the fee as
he wishes. In contrast, the HTLC-success used by the victims must
be signed by both parties (and was in fact already signed when the
HTLC was added), and therefore cannot be changed by the victim
to pay more fees, without the cooperation of the attacker.
The reason the attacker only needs his signature, while victims
need both their signatures and that of the attacker, is that the
published commitments are those of the victims. Contrarily, if the
attacker’s commitment was the one to be published and confirmed,
the attacker would have to use pre-signed transactions, while the
victims could have claimed HTLC outputs without the attacker’s
signature. Of course, in this attack, the victims have no choice but
to publish their commitments before expiration, if they want to
claim their funds.
5This parameter was not named in the specifications, but is described in [29]
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Figure 4: The Lightning channel topology used in our simu-
lations with Bitcoin symbols indicating the liquidity alloca-
tion within channels
Each HTLC output that is successfully claimed by the source
node, is stolen from the recipient of that HTLC, as this HTLC was
already forwarded, and claimed, by the attacker’s target node.
4 EVALUATION
To show the feasibility of the attack we simulated it on a local
Bitcoin’s regtest network. We implemented a prototype of an at-
tacker’s node (a modified version of C-Lightning) that can stall
the return of preimages and ignore peers’ requests. We chose LND
as the client for the victims, as it is the most popular Lightning
implementation used today.6
Each lightning node in our simulation, both the attacker’s and
the victims’, is backed by its own full bitcoin node, running bitcoind,
which are all connected to a central bitcoin node responsible for
mining. Specifically, the attacker does not mine blocks and has no
way to directly affect which transactions are confirmed, other than
setting high fees for his own transactions.
One set of channels is established between the attacker’s source
node and all victims, and is funded by the attacker. Another set of
channels is established between the attacker’s target node and all
victims, and is funded by the victims, so there is liquidity on their
side (in a real world attack, an attacker could fund these channels
and then move liquidity to the other side e.g. by purchasing goods
or depositing funds to an exchange with lightning payments). The
topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 4.
We then route 483 HTLC payments, which is LND’s default
maximum number of unresolved HTLCs at a given moment, from
the source node to the target node through each channel the source
node has. All HTLCs are given the same expiration height. Once
all payments went through, the target node releases all preimages
to resolve the HTLCs, gracefully closes his channels and leaves
with the total amount of HTLCs sent to him by the source node
(closing the target node’s channels is not required for the attack
to succeed, but we do it to show that it can be easily done and
without a significant cost). The source node goes into “silent” mode
and waits until the expiration height to claim any HTLC outputs
6as suggested by [20, 21], more than 90% of the nodes on the Lightning Network runs
LND
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Figure 5: Number of successfully claimed HTLCs vs number
of attacked channels
that remained unspent. The victims have exactly 10 blocks for
their transactions to be confirmed, from the moment they release
their commitments, to the expiration, at which the attacker starts
claiming HTLCs.
With 100 attacked channels, the attacker was able to successfully
steal 7402 HTLC payments out of 48300 that were made in total.
We repeat the simulation multiple times with different number
of attacked channels. The number of successfully stolen HTLCs
as a function of the number of attacked channels can be seen in
Figure 5. We learn that there is a minimal number of channels, that
when passed, the attacker starts to steal funds, and funds of each
additional channel will be stolen as well. We also conduct more
experiments with smaller maximum block size to represent times
of congestion in the network. As we show in Section 5.1, there are
times in which the effective block size available for the victims can
be smaller, due to insufficient fees.
4.1 Finding Potential Victims
The attack we present requires the attacker to establish channels
with multiple victims. In this part we show that opening channels
with unfamiliar nodes does not add a considerable effort to the at-
tacker. Specifically, we show that most of the nodes on the network
agree to open a channel with us upon our request.
According to the Lightning protocol [28], a node indicates its
acceptance to open a channel with another by replying with an
accept_channel message to an open_channel request. We try to
perform this handshake with many nodes on the network.
We start with two lists of the top 50 most connected nodes
(nodes with highest number of open channels) and top 50 nodes
with most liquidity.7 Excluding duplicates, we remain with ad-
dresses of 64 unique nodes. We connect and send an open_channel
message to each one of them, to which 63 reply with a successful
accept_channel.
We move on to find more potential victims. We extract all known
IDs and addresses from the channels our node heard about and try
7downloaded from 1ml.com on 2020-06-07
Successful 'accept_channel' (95.48%)
Unspecified reason (0.62%)
Request timeout (1.38%)
Not ready (blockchain sync) (2.38%)
Unacceptable balance (0.14%)
Figure 6: Nodes’ responses for open-channel requests
to connect to all of them. Out of 4593 nodes, 2102 were responsive
and communicating. Most of the failed attempts to connect were
due to timeout or a refused connection (indicating that no process
was listening at this address, i.e., the node was probably not active).
Out of the 2102 nodes we were able to communicate with, 2007
returned a successful accept_channel message, indicating their
willingness to open a channel. The rest failed for several reasons,
as shown in Figure 6.
This shows that the vast majority of responsive nodes on the
network, specifically more than 95%, are willing to establish a chan-
nel by request, and are therefore susceptible to becoming victims
in our attack.
5 LIGHTNING CHANNEL FEES
To manage a lightning channel, the two parties must agree on the
fee paid by each of the transactions that they both sign. Specifi-
cally, the fee used for commitments and HTLC success/timeout
transactions. When the channel is established for the first time, the
parties agree on a feerate (in Satoshi/KW), denoted the channel’s
feerate, with which they calculate the exact fee for each transac-
tion. The Lightning specifications define a deterministic way to
calculate the fee for each transaction based of the channel’s feerate
and an estimated weight for the transaction (a method for weight
estimation is also described in the protocol). After estimating the
transaction weight, the exact fee that should be paid is obtained
by simply multiplying the feerate and the estimated weight. The
channel’s initiator is the one responsible for paying the fees (the fee
is deducted from his personal output) and is the one proposing the
channel’s feerate when the channel is open. The other party may
reject opening the channel if it thinks the proposed feerate is unrea-
sonable (too low or unnecessarily large). Since fees may fluctuate in
different times, the lightning protocol specifies a way to update the
channel’s feerate. The channel’s initiator (responsible for paying
the fees), and only him, could propose a new channel feerate by
sending an update_fee message with a new proposed feerate, to
which the other node must agree. The protocol states that the other
node (the one who did not initiate the channel) cannot take any
action to update the feerate if it thinks it became unreasonable, with
the rationale that this node is not responsible for paying the fees
(although the node should care about the feerate, as it affects the
node’s HTLC transactions). Any request to update the channel’s
feerate made by the node who is not the channel’s initiator, would
be considered a deviation from the protocol.
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Figure 7: Feerates estimated by bitcoind for immediate con-
firmation
5.1 Feerate Estimations
To test how effective the feerates used in lightning channels are,
we explore the estimation mechanism and see how it affects the
confirmation time of lightning transactions that are published to
the blockchain.
All 3 major implementations (C-lightning, LND, Eclair) rely on a
bitcoin node to estimate feerates. This is achieved by querying the
estimatesmartfee method of bitcoind.8 We continuously queried the
estimatesmartfee method of bitcoind over a period of time and tried
to understand how much block space can be used by transactions
that pay such feerates. In Figure 7 we can see the feerate estimations
made by bitcoind and how volatile these estimations could be in a
relatively short period of time.
We try to estimate what part of blocks can potentially be claimed
by victims’ transactions. Transactions are normally chosen to enter
a block in a decreasing order of their feerate. We therefore define
the available space of block b under feerate f as
available_space(f ,b) = 4000000 −
∑
tx ∈b :
ftx >f
weiдht(tx)
Where ftx is the feerate of transaction tx . In practice, some blocks
are mined without utilizing their entire available weight (4M). The
available space in such blocks will actually be smaller than this
estimate, making it overly optimistic, i.e., in practice victims will
not have this much available block space.
Next we estimate the average available block space that victims
have in the limited time window between publishing the commit-
ment and the HTLC expiration. Since most nodes on the network
run LND, we use a window of 10 blocks (LND’s default commitment-
broadcast-delta).
We first look at a simple attack strategy: The attacker opens
channels with his victims and immediately makes all HTLC pay-
ments, with an expiration of 100 blocks. The feerate used on all
his channels in this case is the one estimated by bitcoind at the
moment the channels were opened. In our observed period of over
2 months, this simple strategy shows that victims have an average
available block space of at least 2M weight units 92% of the time.
Figure 8 shows different possible time points for starting the attack
8LND also supports the EstimateFee method of btcd
Figure 8: The average block space available for victims on
different times of an attack
Figure 9: The average block space available for victims’
transactions
and the average block space available for victims’ transactions, and
implies that rarely is it the case that victims can utilize the entire
space of a block.
A less naive attack strategy can further reduce the available
block space that victims will have, by reducing the channel’s feerate
whenever possible. The strategy we employ proceeds as follows:
The attacker opens channels with his victims and tries to reduce
his channels’ feerates for some period of time before making all
HTLC payments, again with an expiration of 100 blocks. As per the
current Lightning protocol, the victims are not allowed to request
any feerate changes, but do agree to any change proposed by the
attacker, so long as the changematches bitcoind’s latest fee estimate.
Therefore, the attacker can continuously update the feerate to lower
values when the fee estimates allow it, but never raises the feerate
when conditions change in the other direction.
Figure 9 shows the effects of using this feerate minimization
strategy. When minimizing the fees over a period of 1008 blocks
(approximately 7 days), victims have an average available block
space of 2M (or more) weight units, only 58% of the time.
6 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
In this section we discuss several mitigation techniques that can
help to reduce the severity of the attack. We start by emphasizing
some of the key points that make the attack feasible.
An important part of a successful attack is the congestion in the
underlying network when the victims close their channels. This of
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course is not controlled by the victims, but they can better prepare
for it by choosing some parameters more carefully. These include
the time at which the commitment is published, the maximum
allowed number of unresolved HTLCs or the channel’s feerate.
Other key points that allow executing a successful attack cannot
be controlled by the victims, and are in fact inherent to the pro-
tocol itself. The fact that the attacker can easily replace victims’
transactions after the HTLCs expire, is based on 3 protocol rules:
(i) The victim can only claim the HTLCs using HTLC-success
(local) transactions that must be signed by both parties. They
therefore cannot modify their transactions when faced with
an uncooperative attacker
(ii) The HTLC-success transactions published by the victims are
replaceable (as we explain in Section 2.4)
(iii) The attacker’s HTLC-timeout transactions do not require the
signatures of the victims, allowing the attacker to increase the
fees
6.1 Bad Mitigation Strategy: Simplifying
Incoming HTLCs First
A possible mitigation that may come to mind (but is ill advised) is to
enact the following change in the HTLC forwarding process: Once
the secret preimage is propagated back from the target, HTLCs
in each channel on the path are resolved. However, instead of
having nodes agree to resolve an outgoing HTLC immediately
upon receiving the preimage, one might be tempted to require that
nodes forward the secret back towards the sender, and await for
the corresponding incoming HTLC to be resolved first.
Such a process would seemingly raise difficulties for the attacker.
Since the attacker does not intend to resolve any HTLCs within
the first-hop channel, our current mode of attack will be harder
to carry out: No HTLCs will be resolved on the last hop as well,
and the attacker will be forced to publish many HTLC transactions,
and claim them all in a limited amount of time. He will not be able
to increase fees for his transactions, and will in fact find himself
in a similar situation that the victims are in, when attacked. This
could make the attacker lose funds he locked in channels, and thus
disincentivize executing an attack.
The reason we do not recommend this change however, is that
this mitigation introduces a new potential attack that could spam
the blockchain with many more transactions without additional
effort. An attacker could route many payments from and to his own
lightning nodes (similarly to our attack), using as many intermedi-
ate nodes on the payment path. According to this mitigation, none
of the HTLCs on the different channels involved in forwarding the
payments could be resolved before they are resolved by the source
node. If the attacker decides not to resolve HTLCs, all channels on
the payment path, including ones the attacker is not part of, will
be forced to close to the blockchain with all HTLCs unresolved.
In our attack, each victim’s channel generates a number of
blockchain transactions that is proportionate to the number of
HTLCs on that channel. In this new “spam attack”, this number is
multiplied by the length of the payment path, that could include
up to 20 intermediate nodes.
C-Lightning LND Eclair
HTLC expiry delta 14 40 144
Commitment
broadcast delta 7 10 6
Maximum
accepted HTLCs 30 483 30
Table 1: Default values for different channel’s parameters of
major Lightning implementations
6.2 Reducing the Maximum Number of
Unresolved HTLCs
One of the main reasons this attack could work is that there are
only so many HTLC-success transactions that could be confirmed
from the moment the commitments are published until the HTLCs
expire. Once an HTLC has expired, the victim has almost no chance
of claiming it. Reducing the maximal number of unresolved HTLCs
allowed at any moment, would lower the number of transactions
that need to enter the blockchain in that time window. An attacker
will then need more victims in order to steal funds from the same
amount of HTLCs. However, finding an optimal value for the max-
imum allowed HTLCs is not trivial. As this value decreases, the
potential of another attack increases. As shown in [20], a low value
for themax_accepted_htlcs parameter would help an attacker ex-
ecute a denial-of-service attack, by congesting many channels in
the network.
6.3 Deciding When to Close Channels
Currently, the commitment broadcast delta defines the time (prior
to HTLC expiration) that nodes begin to unilaterally close chan-
nels with unresolved incoming HTLCs. The commitment broadcast
delta should be set high enough to allow the node to claim these
soon-to-expire HTLCs, in case the other party is uncooperative.
The Lightning Network specifications [28] suggest publishing the
commitment 7 blocks before expiration.
Default parameters used by different implementations are shown
in Table 1, from which we learn that nodes use a smaller time
window (“Commitment broadcast delta”) to claim HTLCs than they
potentially could (“HTLC expiry delta”).
Simply increasing the commitment broadcast delta, each attacked
node will have more time (blocks) to claim the HTLCs on the
blockchain before they expire and become spendable by the attacker,
making it less probable to lose funds in an attempted attack.
Such change, however, could lead to premature closure of honest
channels in case the previous node is honest but fails to respond in
time. We believe such changes should not be too damaging, as they
are unlikely to happen to honest nodes. A node that just forwarded
an HTLC payment is usually responsive in the next few seconds,
which is oftentimes enough to forward and completely resolve
payments successfully.
A more extreme version of this mitigation is to initiate a closure
of the channel if the previous hop fails to simplify an HTLC within
a short period of time regardless of the HTLC’s expiration time (this
timeout can be specified in seconds, since blocks may sometimes
be created in bursts).
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In short, the benefits from closing channels earlier when faced
with misbehaving peers seem to surpass any downside.
Dynamic closing rules If a node has many pending incoming
HTLCs that the other party does not resolve, it could raise the
likelihood that the node is being attacked. In that case, the channel
should be closed earlier, to avoid losing funds.
We therefore advocate for a more sophisticated policy that dy-
namically sets the commitment broadcast delta for each channel,
based on the potential loss that this channel may incur in case of
an attack. E.g. a commitment broadcast delta of a channel could
increase as the number of concurrent unresolved HTLCs increases
or if the total value of HTLCs is high.
6.4 Do Not Wait for Commitment Tx
Confirmation
When a node decides to unilaterally close one of its channels to
claim incoming HTLCs on the blockchain, it needs to publish its
latest commitment transaction along with a collection of HTLC-
success transactions. In practice, some implementations (e.g., LND
and C-Lightning) wait until the commitment transaction is con-
firmed before releasing the HTLC-success transactions. This way,
nodes lose precious time that can be used to get HTLC transactions
accepted.
Since all of these transactions can be published to the network
immediately, a simple fix would be to do so. This mitigation tech-
nique has no visible drawbacks and is relatively easy to implement
(Eclair nodes already follow this practice).
6.5 Reputation-Based Behavior
As we have shown in our simulations, a high number of maximum
allowed HTLCs helps an attacker to execute a successful attack.
However, a high number is also desirable if we want to support
greater throughput, and therefore a high transaction rate. Similarly,
allowing HTLCs that transfer larger amounts also aids the attacker,
but is desirable for the Lightning Network’s functionality.
We suggest setting the value of these parameters differently for
each channel, and basing them on a reputation score we assign
to the other party with whom we share the channel. A node will
agree to route a greater number of high value HTLCs together with
peers it considers “reputable”. We thus lower the node’s risk and
the potential loss it may suffer in case of an attack.
For example, we can assign a higher reputation score to chan-
nels that we initiate (we chose who the other party is), and give a
lower score to channels that were created based on requests from
unknown counterparts. Reputation scores could grow over time, as
a node proves its ability to “behave well”, which would imply that
attackers would need to run longer-term (and thus more costly)
attacks to have a similar effect.
6.6 Anchor Outputs
A new proposal was made recently [30] that provides an improve-
ment to the way lightning transaction fees are paid. The proposal
introduces another type of commitment output, called an anchor
output. Such outputs may be used by each of the nodes to increase
the fee of a commitment, using the child-pays-for-parent method,
allowing the commitment to be confirmed sooner. Each party will
have its own anchor output in the commitment, which only it can
spend.9 This proposal also changes the structure of HTLC-claiming
transactions by using SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY
signature hash type, allowing to add inputs and increase the fee.
Regarding our attack, this method would allow the victims to pub-
lish their HTLC-success with increased fee, and therefore better
compete with other transactions in the mempool, which they are
not able to do today.
Although the victims would be able to set high fees for their
transactions, they still would not be able to compete with the at-
tacker’s transactions once the HTLCs expire. Since the attacker
constructs his transactions as he wishes (without needing the vic-
tims’ signatures), he could make them irreplaceable, preventing the
victims from replacing them, regardless of how much fee they offer.
The attacker’s transactions may now need to pay more fees (as the
victims could have increased them), yet, since the expired HTLCs
belong to the victims, the attacker loses nothing by paying them.
6.7 Non-Replaceable HTLC transactions
Another possible mitigation would be to prevent the attacker from
replacing the victims’ HTLC-success transactions, by making them
irreplaceable. It appears that replaceability is not strictly needed
for the trustless nature of the protocol. Still, this attempt must be
done carefully, and care should be taken not to break the revocation
mechanisms.
6.8 A Recommendation For Exchanges & Other
Payment Recipients
As we saw in the attack, adding an incoming HTLC to the commit-
ment does not guarantee the receipt of the payment. The amount
of an HTLC payment could be stolen if it is not resolved and the
receiver has to claim it on the blockchain. Therefore, a payment re-
cipient should not consider a payment as received when it is added
to its channel, but only after the sender resolved it and committed
to the new state (with the HTLC amount moved to the balance of
the receiver). In particular, this applies to any exchange or ATM
that accepts deposits through lightning payments and allows the
sender to further transfer or withdraw cash or bitcoins.
7 RELATEDWORK
Many aspects of the Lightning Network have been extensively
studied. A wide survey on second-layer solutions was done in [10].
A technical review of the building blocks of the Lightning Network
is presented in [19].
Some basic attack vectors were mentioned in the original Light-
ning Network paper [22]. One problem that was introduced was a
potential blockchain spamming attack, caused by a malicious party
that forces many channels to be closed at the same time. Yet, no
concrete evaluation was done to see how severe such an attack
might be.
The notion of Channel Exhaustion is discussed in [25]. It de-
scribes a way to disrupt the normal operation of a channel as a
9In practice, once the commitment is deeply confirmed, anchor outputs, whose value
is low, will be spendable by anyone, to prevent a burden on the utxo set
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bi-directional route, by pushing its entire balance to one side, mak-
ing it impossible to route payments in one direction. A detailed
channel exhaustion attack is described in [21].
A known attack technique called Griefing [24] can be used to
execute denial-of-service attacks on the network, by initiating a
multi-hop payment that will be in pending mode for a long period
of time, possibly until it expires entirely. One attack that makes use
of griefing is described in [20], where they exploit the HTLC mech-
anism to block channels from routing payments in both directions
while minimizing the cost of the attack far lower than a traditional
channel exhaustion.
A new proposal has been discussed recently to mitigate grief-
ing attacks [14]. The proposal tries to get an attacker’s channels
closed if he uses griefing, which will impose additional costs to the
attacker and prevent him from routing payments and earning fees.
Yet another solution for griefing attacks is proposed in [2], where
the authors suggest a way to penalize an attacker.
An attack shown in [18] can successfully steal payment fees if a
malicious party controls two nodes on the payment route. This is
achieved by excluding all nodes between the two malicious ones
from the normal process of completing an HTLC transaction, and
thus earning all the fees they should have received from forwarding
the payment.
Another potential attack known as “RBF-pinning” exploits the
HTLC mechanism along with the fact that some Lightning imple-
mentations do not monitor the mempool [4]. Here, an attacker
releases transactions that claim HTLCs (which include the preim-
age), but does so using extremely low fees. This ensures that these
transactions do not appear on the blockchain, but rather stay in
mempools, where the lightning implementations do not detect them
(and hence do not learn the published preimages). The transactions
published by the attacker are irreplaceable, so they cannot be re-
placed by the victim.
Other works study the network from an economic point-of-
view. In [8], the authors explore the relation between the cost of a
lightning payment and the number of hops in its route, and argue
that in some cases, lightning payments can be even more expensive
than normal blockchain transactions. The incentives to participate
in the Lightning Network were analyzed in [3]. According to this
work, participation is in fact irrational for most of today’s large
nodes.
Payment routing was analyzed in [8, 23, 32], and some improve-
ments were proposed for choosing cheaper routes in a way that is
also less prone to attacks.
The Lightning Network’s topology was studied in [15, 26]. It has
been shown that the network is highly centralized, with a small
number of hubs connecting large parts of the network together.
Removing such hubs can partition the network into many compo-
nents.
Other works focus on the privacy of participants in the network.
The network aims to keep nodes’ balances private, and therefore a
channel’s exact balance is never announced. Several methods to de-
duce the exact balance of a channel have been suggested [13, 31, 33].
The main technique is to request a payment via the channel, then,
based on whether the payment succeeds to traverse the channel
or not, the sender learns whether the balance is greater or smaller
than the requested payment amount.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented the Flood & Loot attack, in which an
attacker can successfully steal funds from nodes on the Lightning
Network. We laid concrete steps for how this attack could be exe-
cuted and evaluated it by simulating it locally.
We examined the mechanisms that are used by lightning nodes
to determine blockchain fees and studied their influence on the
success of the attack. We also pointed out ways an attacker could
use to amplify the attack, based on the results of the fee estimation
mechanisms, that would allow him to steal more funds for the same
effort (initial investment and number of opened channels required
for successful execution).
We continuedwith a discussion ofmultiplemitigation techniques
that could reduce the scope of the attack, by taking into account
the fundamental elements that contributed to its success. Still we
believe that in manyways the vulnerabilities exploited by our attack
are inherent to the way HTLCs work, and thus the attack cannot
be avoided completely.
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